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Executive Summary
This paper reviews recent empirical evidence on the effects of hospital owner-
ship conversions on quality of care and provision of public goods, such as Un-
compensated care, and presents new results on these topics based on hospital
discharge data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project's (HCUP) Na-
tionwide Inpatient Sample. My analysis of these data reveals that conversion
from government or private nonprofit to for-profit ownership has no effect on
in-hospital mortality but rates of pneumonia complications increased follow-
ing conversion to for-profit status. Other research, discussed in the paper,
found increased mortality rates following discharge from the hospital for pa-
tients admitted to hospitals that had converted to for-profit ownership. There
was no effect of such conversions on the propensity to admit uninsured or
Medicaid patients. Clearly, there is considerable heterogeneity in outcomes at-
tributable to conversions. Overall, the evidence suggests a role for public scm-
tiny of hospital ownership conversions.
I.Introduction and Policy Context
The hospital industry attracts much public scrutiny, given its important
role in providing personal health services, its sizeabout 3 percent of
gross domestic product, the importance of hospitals as employers in
the communities they serve, and the high share of hospital revenue
from public sources. During the last two decades, the industry has ex-
perienced a dramatic downsizing at the same time, and for that reason,
the methods of paying for hospital care have changed. The market for
hospital care in the year 2000 was much more competitive than it was
in 1980.
Downsizing has taken various forms. First, there has been a reduc-
tion in the number of hospitals. In 1980, there were 5,830 "community"
hospitals (nonfederal short-term general hospitals located outside124 Sloan
institutions). By 1999, the latest year for which data are publicly avail-
able, the number had fallen to 4,956 (figure 5.1). The number of com-
munity hospitals peaked during the 1970s. Second, existing hospitals
have reduced bed capacity from a peak of slightly over 1.0 million beds
in 1983 to 830,000 beds in 1999 (figure 5.2). Third, hospitals have
diversified, integrating both vertically and horizontally, and they have
sought new ownership and management. As an extreme measure,
many hospitals have closed.
For-profit (F) hospitals run counter to the national trend in number
and bed capacity (figures 5.1 and 5.2). The number of such hospitals
has remained relatively constant in terms of numbers of hospitals and
has risen in terms of number of beds under such hospital ownership.
Although the number of private nonprofit hospitals (N) peaked in
1984, as did the number of beds, the subsequent decline in both has
been small relative to the decline in number of public (G) hospitals and
beds in such hospitals. In fact, most of the decline in community hospi-
tal capacity has occurred in state and local government community
hospitals. Thus, the trend has been to a privatized hospital system with
some relative increase in the share of private hospitals under for-profit
ownership. These changes reflect hospital closings, mergers, as well as
ownership changes among existing hospitals.
This study focuses on hospital ownership changes and the effects of
such changes. Although government or private nonprofit ownership to
for-profit ownership receives the most publicity, in fact, changes have
occurred in all directions (Needleman et al. 1997). Relatively more at-
tention has been paid to conversions from G and N to F ownership for
several reasons. There is a concern that hospitals with a profit-seeking
mission as an explicit motive are less likely to accept unprofitable cases
for treatment, such as persons who lack health insurance or who are
underinsured. Given the goal of maximizing profit, such hospitals may
be more likely to exploit loopholes in the reimbursement rules; they
may be more willing to reduce quality of care, especially quality attrib-
utes that are difficult for patients, and perhaps even their physicians,
to monitor ("noncontractable quality"; see, for example, Hart et al.
1997).
Allegations of adverse effects associated with ownership conversion
are easily made. But obtaining rigorous empirical support for such alle-
gations is a much more difficult matter. Any in-depth study of the ef-
fects of ownership change on access to and quality of care and on
business practices should account for the following factors.Year
Figure 5.1





Source: American Hospital Association (1976, 1979, 2001). The data before 1979 are for
nonfederal, short-term general and other special hospitals, which include community
hospitals plus hospitals in institutions.
First, hospitals do not change ownership in a vacuum. Hospitals that
convert may have specific attributes that distinguish them from hospi-
tals that do not convert. These attributes may be a characteristic of the
hospital and/or of the market in which the hospital operates. If a hos-
pital did not change ownership in the particular way proposed, what
was the alternative course of action? The hospital industry is a mature
industry, in a sense, more like steel than e-commerce. In an industry
that is downsizing, there are rarely many attractive alternatives. Thus,
even if the outcomes are worse than before, such outcomes could have
been even worse if the choice to change ownership had not been made.
The alternative to conversion may have been closure. Under such cir-
cumstances, all persons in the locality may have experienced a de-
crease in access to hospital care, and the loss of jobs to the community
may have been far greater than occurred as a consequence of
"efficiency measures" implemented by the acquirer. It is essential to
ask the "what if" question, both in policy and in empirical analysis of
effects of ownership changes.
Second, some of the observed changes reflect change in ownership



























Source: American Hospital Association (1976, 1979, 2001). The data before 1979 are for
nonfederal, short-term general and other special hospitals, which include community
particularly true during the first few years following a conversion, as
hospitals adjust to new management and strategies.
A third point pertains to policy adoption based on empirical evi-
dence of undesirable outcomes following specific types of hospital
ownership conversions. If changes in mission and in behavior are ob-
served, are there more direct and efficient policy instruments for ensur-
ing desirable behavior than simply blocking a certain type of
conversion? For example, if fraud and abuse in hospital reporting of
patient information for purposes of reimbursement is a widespread
practice, a more direct approach would involve direct public oversight
and enforcement rather than indirectly affecting such behavior by
influencing the mix of hospitals according to their propensities to en-
gage in undesirable behaviors. As discussed below, some researchers
have found that profit-seeking behavior is contagious. That is, when
for-profit hospitals engage in certain kinds of behavior, their hospital
competitors with different ownership forms may emulate it.
There is a lot of empirical literature on the relationship between hos-
pital ownership and various performance measures (see, for example,
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whether they are for-profit or nonprofit, are more alike than different.
The vast number of studies, however, have assessed the effects of own-
ership type on hospital behavior rather than ownership conversions.
The latter may be particularly insightful because they discuss location
and characteristics that potentially influence behavior associated with
location constant and examine changes that occurred post- versus
preconversion. Norton and Staiger (1994) found differences in hospital
behavior by ownership status, but the differences were attributable to
where for-profit versus other types of hospitals decided to locate. For
example, a profit-seeking hospital may decide to locate in a relatively
affluent suburb, where well-insured persons are located, rather than
in an inner city, where people are much more likely to be uninsured
or to be enrolled in Medicaid (oneof the less generous third-party
payers).
The dearth of studies on hospital ownership conversions reflects the
difficulty of obtaining accurate data on conversion dates and conver-
sion types. This problem has been remedied in the present study and in
some studies reviewed below. After comparingownership codes from
two independent sources, the Annual Survey of Hospitals (conducted
by the American Hospital Association) and Medicare Cost Reports, my
students called hospitals for which the two sources differed to deter-
mine whether the conversion occurred, when it occurred, and the own-
ership types before and after conversions. In total, about 300 telephone
calls were made.
Compared to the number of quantitative studies, there have been
very few qualitative studies of ownershipand ownership conversions.
Qualitative studies may be called "soft" but at the same time, they can
reveal differences among and changes in decision-making processes
that otherwise can only be inferred very indirectly from outcome
changes. By peering inside hospital decision making, especially deci-
sion making in the presence of major stress and organizational change,
we can enhance our understanding of thesechanges. Such analysis also
provides an important cross-check on findings from the quantitative
analysis.
Qualitative analysis is not done mostly because it is so difficult to do.
Decision makers undergoing change and/or associated with choices
that did not lead to a successful outcome are not likely to want to have
their decisions and the consequences scrutinized. Also, there is no ex-
plicit hypothesis testing, as in quantitative research. In the end, one
gains an impression without the sharply defined results of a rejected
null hypothesis.128 Sloan
In this paper, I review and evaluate very recent research (mostly
published in 2000 or later) on the relationship between hospital owner-
ship and behavior, and I present new empirical results on ownership
conversions based on empirical analysis of hospital discharge data for
the years 1988 through 1996, the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Pro-
ject's (HCUP) Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS). HCUP is an intra-
mural program of the U.S. Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality.
Using qualitative as well as quantitative evidence, the public policy
questions addressed in this paper are those posed above. Does owner-
ship conversion, especially to the for-profit ownership form, lead to in-
creased care barriers, diminished quality of care, and profit-seeking
billing practices designed to maximize reimbursement? Do acquirers of
hospitals pay prices for the facilities that are commensurate with earn-
ing a fair rate of return on their investments? Or do acquirers pay too
little for community assets in the form of hospitals? If there is evidence
of market failure in this context, what are the appropriate public
remedies?
Section II of this paper reviews empirical evidence on the effects of
ownership and ownership conversions on behavior. Section III de-
scribes a new investigation of the effects of ownership conversions
from G and N to F ownership and the reverse, from F to G or N. To the
extent that hospital decision making becomes more profit-oriented
when hospitals convert from G or N status, one should observe the op-
posite when hospitals convert from F to G or N status. Thus, by exam-
ining the effects of conversions in both directionstoward and away
from for-profit statusthe empirical analysis makes it possible to dis-
tinguish the effects of change of ownership type from the effects of con-
version per Se. Section IV presents results from a sample of Medicare
beneficiaries and Section V results from a sample of patients not yet
age-eligible for Medicare. Section VI further evaluates the findings and
explores the implications of the results for public policies as they relate
to hospital ownership conversions.
II. New Empirical Evidence on Ownership Effects and on Hospital
Conversions
Why Hospitals Convert
Using qualitative as well as quantitative methods, several recent stud-
ies have analyzed why hospitals change ownership status. The majorHospital Ownership Conversions 129
determinants of ownership change are financial distress prior to the
change, mostly due to a reduction in aggregate demand for hospital in-
patient care and an increase in competition among hospitals, which ne-
cessitates implementation of new competitive strategies that were
more difficult to introduce under the prior regime. A study of five pub-
lic hospitals that converted from public to nonprofit ownership gave
two reasons for the changes: (1) a reluctance of public facifities to ex-
pand beyond their political jurisdiction and (2) governance and man-
agement restrictions that made it more difficult to compete with other
hospitals (Legnini et al. 2000).
Burns et al. (2001) performed case studies of sixteen hospitals that
changed ownership between 1993 and 1996. Among the sixteen hospi-
tals were conversions from private nonprofit to for-profit, for-profit to
nonprofit, public to for-profit, and public to nonprofit ownership. The
case studies revealed two primary motivations for conversion regard-
less of ownership type, even though the two both come down to
money. First, with one exception, the hospitals reported current or an-
ticipated financial stress as a motivation. By joining a chain or reducing
managerial constraints in the case of public hospitals, the hospitals
hoped to improve financial performance. A motivator for the hospitals
converting from nonprofit to for-profit governance was access to equity
capital. In one case, the hospital was not considered to be "strategic
enough" to justify further investment by its nonprofit owner, but the
hospital fit the strategy of a for-profit purchaser. In the case of for-profit
to nonprofit conversions, the hospital had not met the former owners'
required financial return. Reasons for the public to private conversions
included poor hospital financial management under the previous own-
ership. In the extreme, the alternative for the hospital was closure.
Second, nearly all the hospitals said that they were faced with an in-
ability to compete for managed-care contracts. By joining a larger, more
dominant hospital in the local market, the hospital was in a stronger
position when dealing with managed-care organizations. A desire to
change its mission was a motive only rarely for an ownership conver-
sion. Transitions to for-profit ownership were motivated by both "pull"
and "push" factors. The former included an attractive financial offer;
the latter included siphoning off hospital cash flow by the former
owner. Transitions from for-profit ownership to the other forms tended
to be motivated by push factors, including failure to realize a required
return.
In a review of conversion financing, Robinson (2000) reported that
most conversions from private nonprofit to for-profit status are130 Sloan
initiated by the nonprofit trustees and thus resemble friendly lever-
aged buyouts. At the same time, many nonprofit hospitals have cre-
ated for-profit subsidiaries and continue to function as nonprofit
organizations.
Conover et al. (2001) provide a recent study of the determinants of
hospital closings, mergers, and ownership changes. Hospitals that con-
verted experienced on average a major decline in financial perfor-
mance in the years immediately preceding conversion. In this sense,
converting hospitals were not typically successful businesses prior to
conversion. In the absence of a change in ownership, some other out-
come, including closing, was often inevitable.
What Is Being Bought and Sold?
The financial transaction involves a purchase or lease price, and much
more. The transaction may be parsed into two elements, the price and
provisions of the transaction other than price.1 On price, the issue is
whether or not acquirers pay a fair price for the facility, given dis-
counted cash flows that are likely to accrue from the transaction. In the
vast majority of transactions in the general economy, the underlying as-
sumption is that buyers and sellers are sufficiently informed to allow
the market to set the transaction price. In this context, there is a concern
that sellers may not be sufficiently well informed and may obtain too
little in return for relinquishing a major community asset. On the
nonprice dimensions, there is a concern that acquirers will be driven by
profit considerations, and provision of public goods by hospitals, such
as provision of care to uninsured persons, public health programs, and
education and research other than that sponsored by an outside public
or private organization, will be reduced as a consequence.
Much of the evidence on these two questions comes from case stud-
ies of ownership conversions. To date, the literature has provided no
clear answers to the price question. As far as the nonprice question is
concerned, the evidence is somewhat reassuring but preliminary.
The price question has been addressed by two recent empirical stud-
ies. Conover and Sloan (2001) assessed rates of return on a sample of
hospital purchases starting in the early 1980s. Wide variations in rates
of returns were observed, with conversions to for-profit status exhibit-
ing higher rates of return than other types of changes in hospital own-
ership. On average, rates of return were well above the cost of capital
when hospitals converted to for-profit status, but somewhat closer to
the cost of capital otherwise.Hospital Ownership Conversions 131
In an earlier study, rates of return tended to be closer to the cost of
capital, but that study was limited to ownership conversions that oc-
curred in North and South Carolina and had a shorter postconversion
follow-up period, meaning that more of the measured return was
based on projected rather than actual cash flows (Sloan et al. 2000).
Methodologies used in the two studies were similar. A weakness of
both studies is that it was possible to make only crude adjustments for
nonprice concessions granted by buyers to sellers.
On the second question, it is necessary to glean bits of evidence from
qualitative studies. Blumenthal and Weissman (2000) provided case
studies of the sales of three teaching hospitals to investor-owned hospi-
tal chains, focusing in particular on the effects of the sales on the orga-
nizations' medical education missions. In all three, there were no
adverse effects. The authors attributed the lack of an effect to three fac-
tors. First, the for-profit purchasers considered preservation of some
unprofitable activities a cost of doing business at these institutions.
The contracts of sale stipulated that specific resources be devoted to
teaching, resource, and charity care. Second, private subsidization
of medical education may not be that burdensome to the new owners,
given external subsidies such as for graduate medical education. Third,
at the time the study was written, all three institutions were doing
well financially. If faced with financial stress, their missions could
change.
Cutler and Horwitz (2000) studied conversions of the Wesley Medi-
cal Center in Wichita, Kansas, and HealthOne in Denver, Colorado.
Both were large teaching facilities. The first was purchased by Hospital
Corporation of America in 1985. Two foundations were funded with
proceeds from the sale. In the HealthOne transaction, the hospital en-
tered into a joint venture with Columbia/HCA in 1995. After the trans-
action, the new HealthOne organization concentrated on graduate
medical education, paying faculty and residents and administering
medical education at its facilities. Cutler and Horwitz found improve-
ments in financial performance after the conversion and the mission
previous to ownership conversion was maintained. Improved financial
performance came in part from the skill of the for-profits at increasing
public sector reimbursements, not solely from efficiency gains.
Outcomes following conversion are not uniformly favorable. Burns
et al. (2000) described "the Allegheny system debacle." This is a case
study involving the Allegheny Health, Education and Research Foun-
dation, which consisted of a major teaching facility in western Pennsyl-
vania and several afffliate hospitals throughout the state. The authors132 Sloan
attributed failure in part to failure of external oversight mechanisms,
including lack of performance of the organization's board, accountants,
and auditors; bond-rating agencies; and state government. There was
ambiguity regarding the powers of the state attorney general, state poi-
itics, and jurisdictional issues with federal bankruptcy court. Pennsyl-
vania law is ambiguous regarding the attorney general's power over
transactions with nonprofits.
The sixteen case studies reported in Burns et al. (2001) revealed that,
in all but one conversion, the financial status of the hospital improved
after the conversion. There were funds from the sale or lease of the fa-
cility New hospital owners invested in hospital plant and equipment,
particularly in hospitals converting from private nonprofit to for-profit
status, although in some cases, the investment after the conversion was
not as great as hospital management had anticipated. Improvements in
margins were achieved by cutting staff,2 improving purchasing prac-
tices, and consolidating services lines in a network approach.
Changes in decision-making style depended mostly on whether the
new organization was a multihospital system or a freestanding facility
In fact, the transition to being part of a larger system was on balance
more important than was the specific change in ownership form. Those
hospitals that became part of a chain lost some local autonomy in deci-
sion making. But there were differences in the strategic decision-
making process among chains and even in treatment of individual fa-
cilities within a particular chain. Overall, the organization's general
mission remained intact, as specified, for example, in the sales contract,
while the methods for achieving its objectives changed.
Anderson et al. (2001) studied changes in internal decision making
after conversion in ownership status at the same set of converting
hospitals as in Burns et al. (2001), but they also included a comparison
with twenty-two nonconverting hospitals matched on location, owner-
ship (prior to conversion), and bed size. They found that, relative
to nonconverted hospitals, converted hospitals had greater levels of
physician and nurse participation in hospital decision making; in
the converted group, these health professionals had greater influence
over final choices made. These agents' interconnections and interac-
tions may have intensified as the organizations tried to cope with the
changes brought about by the conversion. Alternatively, granting
more influence to professionals may have been a compromise struck
to overcome professionals' resistance to change. The study assessed
participation at three to six years following ownership conversion.Hospital Ownership Conversions 133
Thus, the change in participation was not only transitory However, in-
creased participation by health professionals is more closely related
logically to provision of care to individual patients than to policies af-
fecting the community as a whole, such as provision of care to the
uninsured.
Effects of Hospital Ownership Changes on Quality of Care
Two recent studies have assessed differences in quality of care by hos-
pital ownership status. One is a comparison of differences in quality by
ownership. The other explicitly examined the effect of change in own-
ership on quality of care. Both studies relied on Medicare administra-
tive records to gauge outcomes of care. At least to some extent, both
studies account for methodological complexities of discerning effects
of conversions discussed in the previous section. Both studies imply
that conversion to for-profit status may lead to some reduction in qual-
ity of care as measured by mortality rates at various times after dis-
charge from the hospital.
McClellan and Staiger (2000) examined all Medicare hospital dis-
charges for acute myocardial infarction for 1984-1994 and for ischemic
heart disease for 1984-1991. The outcome measures were death within
ninety days of admission and cardiac complications leading to re-
admission. Many of the details are beyond the scope of this review.
One purpose of that study was to develop a hospital-specific measure
of quality with a high signal-to-noise ratio. However, the findings on
hospital quality, measured in terms of patient survival, are highly perti-
nent here.
First, when county-level fixed effects were included, the estimated
mortality difference between N and F hospitals fell by roughly half, im-
plying that for-profit hospitals tend to locate in geographic areas where
hospital quality is not as high in general. This may be partly because
for-profits often acquire facilities that are not doing well financially.
This still left some amount of lower quality attributable to being a
for-profit hospital.
Second, in the three markets they considered in detail, for-profit hos-
pitals did not have higher mortality rates. In one of these markets, a
for-profit firm acquired a low-quality hospital, gauged in terms of mor-
tality rates, and quality at that hospital subsequently improved.
Overall, these results lend support to the conclusion that some of the
results on quality differences reflect differential patterns by hospital134 Sloan
ownership in the location of their facilities rather than in fundamental
differences in hospital behavior. The authors concluded that:
[O]n average, the performance of not-for-profit hospitals in treating elderly pa-
tients with heart disease appears to be slightly better than that of for-profit hos-
pitals, even after accounting for systematic differences in hospital size, teach-
ing status, urbanization, and patient demographic characteristics. This average
difference appears to be increasing over time. However, this small average dif-
ference masks an enormous amount of variation in hospital quality within the
for-profit and the private nonprofit categories. Our case-study results also sug-
gest that for-profits may provide the impetus for quality improvements where,
for various reasons, relatively poor quality of care is the norm. (p. 111)
In a comment on the McClellan-Staiger study, Wolfram (2000)
stressed that survival to ninety days after the admission date repre-
sents only one dimension of quality. While no informed person would
seek admission at a hospital with a markedly higher mortality rate,
other attributes such as the time that providers spend with patients, are
also plausibly important. She also noted that McClellan and Staiger
may not have adequately controlled for patient selection. For example,
if more severely ifi patients (in ways that the researcher cannot meas-
ure) seek care at private nonprofit hospitals, the true differential in
quality between these institutions and for-profits will be higher than
the difference the researchers measured.
Several strategies deal with this issue, none of which is perfect. One
is to include more explanatory variables, such as Wolfram's suggestion
to include a binary variable for the presence of a trauma center.3 If pri-
vate nonprofits are more likely to have trauma centers, they may attract
the most vulnerable heart attack victims.4 Other approaches involve in-
strumental variables and difference-in-difference. In the end, more
progress is likely to be made by supplementing statistical approaches
with case studies that identify changes in processes of care that occur in
hospitals with different ownership form.
Picone et al. (forthcoming) also assessed health outcomes using
Medicare data for the years 1984-1995. They studied death at thirty
days, six months, and one year. The underlying hypothesis was that
hospitals converting to for-profit ownership raise profitability after ac-
quiring the facilities in part by reducing dimensions of quality not
readily observed by patients or their physician agents and by raising
prices. Hospital-specific mortality rates after discharge from the hospi-
tal are one important dimension of such hard-to-observe quality. The
authors found that one to two years subsequent to conversion toHospital Ownership Conversions 135
for-profit status, the mortality rate of patients at one year following ad-
mission rose markedly. At the same time, hospital staffing decreased. A
similar decline in quality was not observed after hospitals switched
from for-profit status to government or to private nonprofit ownership
status. At three or more years following conversion to for-profit owner-
ship, the decline in quality was much lower (relative to the quality that
prevailed at the hospital at five years before the conversion occurred).
A plausible interpretation consistent with the data is that the new
for-profit owners (or their managers) experienced adverse effects after
the staffing cuts and reversed course at three years or so following the
date of acquisition. By adding staff, some improvements in quality
were then realized.
Effects of Hospital Ownership Changes on Provision of Public Goods
A major policy concern is that ownership conversions, especially to the
for-profit form, will result in decreased provision of public goods. Most
frequently mentioned among such public goods is provision of care to
the uninsured, sometimes cast in terms of provision of uncompensated
care. The empirical evidence on this score is mixed. Comparing provi-
sion of uncompensated care across ownership types, one is struck by
the similarity between shares of dollar amounts of uncompensated care
relative to hospital revenue provided by N and F hospitals. Govern-
ment hospital uncompensated shares, not surprisingly, tend to be
higher than for N and F hospitals (Sloan 2000).
A recent study, which focused on ownership conversions, calls the
conclusion that the main distinction in provision of uncompensated
care is between private and public hospitals into question. Using un-
published and confidential data on revenue from the American Hospi-
tal Association, Thorpe et al. (2000) studied the effects of conversion
from N to F status on hospital provision of uncompensated care. They
measured uncompensated care as bad debt and charity care charges
deflated by each hospital's cost-to-charge ratio for 1991-1997. To ac-
count for variations in hospital capacity and inflation, they divided this
amount by total expenses for the hospital. They included several ex-
planatory variables in their analysis, most notably hospital fixed ef-
fects. They found little effect of conversion to for-profit status on
Medicaid patient loads. However, uncompensated care fell after con-
version from N to F status, falling from 5.3 percent to 4.7 percent of hos-
pital revenue on average. The 0.6 percentage-point reduction in136 Sloan
uncompensated care amounted to about $400,000 less being spent per
converted hospital on uncompensated care. For public hospitals con-
verting to for-profit status, the decrease was greater, from 5.2 to 2.7 per-
cent, or $800,000, per hospital. The authors expressed the amounts in
terms of admissions lost even though they provided no indication
whether the decrease occurred on the inpatient or outpatient sides of
the hospital or in some combination thereof. Thorpe et al. concluded
that:
Of concern, however, is our findings that the provision of uncompensated care
is reduced when hospitals convert to for-profit status. Of particular concern is
the large reduction in uncompensated care observed among public to for-profit
hospital conversions. Because the bulk of these conversions occurred among
smaller, rural public hospitals, such conversions could limit access to hospital
care among the uninsured. (p. 192)
The implication is that conversions cause reductions in uncompen-
sated care and that these reductions could not be accounted for by in-
ward shifts in demand largely exogenous to the hospitals involved in
the conversions. The authors noted that their result for nonprofit to
for-profit conversions had not been found in previous studies (see, for
example, Desai etal. 2000). I shall return to this issue in the next section
when I discuss my own empirical analysis.
Several recent studies have focused not on the effect of ownership
change on the provision of public goods and more generally on prod-
uct mix, but more specifically on the effects of competition from
for-profit hospitals on the behavior of nonprofit and public hospitals.5
The Disproportionate Share (DSH) Program was implemented nation-
ally to provide a greater financial incentive for hospitals to deliver care
to the poor. Subject to this federal law, each state could design its own
DSH program.
Duggan (2000a, 2000b) studied the change in financial incentives
created by California's variant of the DSH program on the propensity
of hospitals to treat Medicaid recipients. This DSH program provided
an explicit financial incentive for hospitals to admit Medicaid patients.
It increased revenues to hospitals for which low-income patients
constituted more than 25 percent of their patients. Hospitals above
this threshold experienced a revenue increase, and those below this
threshold had an incentive to increase their low-patient shares to this
level.
Duggan (2000b) found an appreciable difference in response be-
tween public and private hospitals, regardless of whether they were NHospital Ownership Conversions 137
or F. The public hospitals faced a "soft budget" constraint; that is, as
their revenues from DSH increased, their sponsors lowered their subsi-
dies accordingly. By contrast, both N- and F-owned facilities could ac-
cumulate wealth from this new revenue source. He concluded that the
greatest difference in response to the DSH incentive was between pub-
lic and private rather than between N and F hospitals.
In the second study, Duggan (2000a) found that DSH resulted in a
shift of Medicaid patients from public to private hospitals. The magni-
tude of the shift was directly related to the market share of for-profit
hospitals in the county In particular, the response of N hospitals to the
DSH incentive was greater when they faced more competition from the
for-profit sector. The implication is that N hospitals behave more like
profit-maximizers when faced with the market discipline of the
for-profits. Various tests that Duggan performed rejected alternative
explanations for his finding (for example, quality of care in the public
facifities). An examination of the effects of competition from F hospitals
on the board composition of N hospitals revealed that N hospital
boards had larger shares of physicians when they faced competition
from the F hospitals. Duggan reported that F boards contained large
numbers of physician members.6 Inthissense, N boards in
F-influenced areas may put physicians on the boards as their mission
becomes more profit oriented. However, other interpretations seem at
least as likely. For one, placing physicians on the board may be a com-
petitive response by N hospitals to retain their medical staffs.
Silverman and Skinner (2001) assessed the effects of hospital compe-
tition on mission, but from a different perspective. Since implementa-
tion of the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS), hospitals have
known that the pattern of reporting of diagnoses and procedures can
affect the diagnosis-related group (DRG) assigned to the case and
hence the amount of revenue received from Medicare. Upcoding in-
volves rearranging reports of diagnoses and/or procedures, with the
result that the patient falls within a higher-priced DRG. Some upcod-
ing may be perfectly legitimate. In some cases, it may improve accu-
racy of reporting. But given the financial incentive to upcode, there is a
large gray area. More profit-oriented hospitals may be more willing to
take advantage of the incentive to increase revenue from Medicare.
Even for those hospitals that are not fully profit oriented, pressures
from competition may force them to act in this way. The authors lim-
ited their analysis to hospital admissions involving pneumonia and re-
spiratory infections. Between 1989 and 1996, the number of the most138 Sloan
expensive DRG in this diagnosis family rose by 10 percentage points
among stable N hospitals, 23 percent among stable F hospitals, but 37
percentage points among N hospitals that converted to F status.
Silverman and Skinner obtained two major findings. First, holding
many other factors constant, for-profit hospitals were more likely to
upcode in this diagnostic category than most nonprofit and govern-
ment hospitals. Second, the authors found evidence that upcoding
among N hospitals was much more likely when they faced greater
competition from F hospitals. By contrast, the upcoding behavior of the
for-profits was not affected by the presence of nonprofits.7 During the
latter part of the 1990s, Medicare became more aggressive in monitor-
ing hospital billing practices, with the consequence that some hospitals
made large payments to compensate for shortcomings in past billing
practices.8
III.Evidence from a National Sample of Hospital Discharges
Objectives of the Analysis
To assess further the effect of hospital ownership conversions on qual-
ity, patient mix, especially willingness to treat publicly insured and un-
insured persons, and upcoding, I assessed hospital discharge data from
the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) Nationwide Inpa-
tient Sample (NIS). Results from this analysis are reported in this study
for the first time. This data set offers many advantages. There is a very
large number of observations, and the data come from many states and
are available for several years. The hospital, but of course, not a patient
identifier, is provided. The main disadvantage of the data is that no in-
formation is available on patients after they were discharged from the
hospital. Also, there is no information on hospital outpatient care.
Data and Methods
The NIS is a compilation of data from state hospital discharge data-
collection systems made available through the U.S. Agency for Health-
care Research and Quality I limited the analysis to hospital admissions
occurring during the years 1988-1996. Data from the following states
were included for some or all of the observational period: Arizona, Cal-
ifornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,Hospital Ownership Conversions 139
Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wis-
consin. Each year, the NIS provides discharge abstract data from about
5 to 7.1 hospital stays from over 900 hospitals per year. The NIS is de-
signed to approximate a 20-percent sample of U.S. community hospi-
tals. The NIS is not designed to be representative of community
hospitals in terms of ownership. Of the states included in the NIS, Cali-
fornia and Florida had the most admissions, by far, to for-profit hospi-
tals. Tennessee has a high for-profit market share but is a much smaller
state and was included in the NIS only for part of the observational pe-
riod. Texas, another state with a high for-profit market share, was not
included in the NIS.
Separate analyses were conducted on admissions of (1) persons over
the age of 65 at admissionhereafter called the "Medicare sample"
and (2) births and admissions of persons who were between the ages of
1 and 64 on the admission datethe non-Medicare sample (although a
minority of persons in the under-age-65 group also had Medicare as
the primary payer). For the Medicare analysis, the sample was limited
to persons who were admitted for one of five primary diagnoses:
stroke, hip fracture, coronary heart disease, congestive heart failure,
and pneumonia. To facifitate analysis, the NIS 10 percent sample was
used with one exception. In the analysis of discharges of persons who
were between the ages of I and 64 on the admission date, I used a 25
percent sample of NIS's 10 percent patient sample.
The Medicare and non-Medicare samples were each divided into
two subsamples. The first consisted of admissions to hospitals that
were under government or private nonprofit ownership prior to con-
version and changed to for-profit ownership or remained under gov-
ernment or private nonprofit ownership during the observational
period, 1988-1996 (the GN sample). The second included admissions to
hospitals that were under for-profit ownership but converted to GN
status during the observational period, as well as those that remained
for-profit (the F sample).
Six hypotheses about effects of ownership conversions from GN to F
and F to GN status were tested. Conversions from F to GN ownership
were hypothesized to have the opposite effect of conversions from GN
to F. By employing a two-sided test, I was able to distinguish between
the effects of conversion and those attributable to a change in owner-
ship. In combining the G and N categories, I focused on changes in be-140 Sloan
havior to and from the for-profit ownership form rather than on the
private versus public ownership distinction. The six hypotheses are
listed below:
Quality of care falls following conversion from GN to F ownership.
This may occur because profit-seeking hospitals seek to achieve higher
profitability by cutting hospital inputs, such as personnel.
Quality may be increased, but only when it is profitable to do so,
that is, when higher quality results in an additional payment sufficient
to cover the additional marginal cost of the higher quality level.
Following conversion from GN to F status (when subject to a fixed
payment per case, as under the Medicare Prospective Payment Sys-
tem), the hospital becomes more aggressive in reducing length of stay.
Again, the motive for reducing stays is to increase profitability
Increasing transfers to nursing homes postdischarge is one manifes-
tation of a strategy for reducing the length of stay.
To increase payment from Medicare, the hospital upcodes diagnoses
more frequently following a conversion from GN to F status. This is an
extension of Silverman and Skinner's (2001) research, but for a differ-
ent set of diagnoses.
Following conversion from GN to F ownership, the hospital be-
comes less likely to admit publicly insured and uninsured patients.
This analysis used only the non-Medicare sample and sought to repli-
cate the finding by Thorpe et al. (2000) that conversion to for-profit
ownership led to reductions in hospital provision of uncompensated
care.
For the analysis of the admissions of persons aged 65 and over, the
dependent variables were inpatient mortality; extended length of stay;
length of stay; pneumonia complication; destination at discharge
home (omitted reference group), nursing home, other hospital, or
death; and upcoding of diagnoses. Extended length of stay was defined
as a stay two standard deviations above the mean stay for the primary
diagnosis and the year in which the admission occurred. The pneumo-
nia complication was taken from the list of secondary diagnoses pro-
vided on the hospital discharge abstract. In this analysis, elderly
persons admitted with a primary diagnosis of pneumonia were
excluded.
Upcoding was tested by two analyses. In the first, the dependent
variable was 1 if the primary diagnosis was listed as a transientHospital Ownership Conversions 141
ischemic attack (TIA) and 0 if the primary diagnosis was listed as a
stroke. Medicare pays more for strokes than TIAs. There is some discre-
tion in classifying patients between these two diagnoses. The second
was the DRG weight assigned to the case, limiting the sample to the
five primary diagnoses listed above.
A sample of births was analyzed to test the sixth and second hypoth-
eses. The dependent variables were patient did not have private insur-
ance, patient stayed in the hospital for less than two days, and patient
had a vaginal birth as opposed to a cesarean sectionthe underlying
presumption being that C-sections are more profitable on average than
are vaginal births. With the sample of births, the dependent variable
was payment source other than private insurance versus private insur-
ance. The other category included Medicaid, Medicare or other govern-
ment insurance (such as Veterans Administration, Champus), self-pay
or no charge (suggesting no health insurance coverage), and private in-
surance (the omitted reference group). With the sample of persons with
any diagnosis or principal procedure who were between the ages of 1
and 64 at the admission date, the dependent variables were each of the
payer categories for public payers and self-pay/no charge with pri-
vately insured individuals, the omitted reference group.
With the exceptions noted below, four alternative specifications were
employed. The methodology for the Medicare analysis is explained in
detail here. Specifications for the non-Medicare were similar. Each suc-
cessive specification added a set of explanatory variables, retaining the
explanatory variables from the previous specification.
The first specification included explanatory variables identifying ad-
missions after ownership conversion occurred, patient characteristics,
market characteristics, and binary variables for the year of admission.
The patient characteristics were age; race; gender; source of admis-
sionemergency room, nursing home, other hospital versus home; bi-
nary variables for the five primary diagnoses; DRG weight; and the
DxCG score. The DxCG is a case mix measure that accounts for the pa-
tient's secondary diagnoses (see wwwdxcg.com).
The market characteristics were a Herfindahi index based on bed
shares, the fraction of the population enrolled in health maintenance
organizations, population density (population per square mile), hospi-
tal beds per 1,000 population, and per-capita income. For hospitals lo-
cated in standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs), the market
area was assumed to be the SMSA. For hospitals located outside
SMSAs, the market area was the county.142 Sloan
In the second specification, I added a conversion fixed effect binary
variable. The conversion fixed effects identified admissions to hospitals
involved in a conversion from G or N to F, or F to G or N during the ob-
servational period. In the third specification, I added explanatory vari-
ables for hospital characteristics: bedsize; the number of resident
physicians per bed, a measure of commitment to medical education;
the hospital's operating margin; debt-to-asset ratio; and occupancy
rateall defined for the year in which the admission occurred. For hos-
pitals with a negative operating margin, the operating margin was set
equal to 0 and an additional binary variable, "no profit," was set to 1.
Likewise, if the debt-to-asset ratio exceeded 1, the ratio was set to 1 and
a binary variable was included to identify such cases. Although the
hospital characteristics are possibly endogenous, there is an argument
for including them. In their absence, the ownership and ownership
change variables may represent other hospital characteristics, includ-
ing financial distress that may be the true causal determinants of the
dependent variables. By considering alternative specifications, it is
possible to gauge the sensitivity of findings to inclusion/exclusion of
these explanatory variables.
Finally, the fourth specification added area fixed effects. These were
binary variables for the SMSA in which the hospital was located and
for non-SMSA hospitals, a binary variable measuring the hospital's
state. When the dependent variable was more than one mutually exclu-
sive alternative, I used multinomial logit analysis and did not include




The main GN sample consisted of 419,000 hospital discharges from
1,215 hospitals (table 5.1). Of these, over 16,000 hospital discharges
were from forty-nine hospitals that changed from G or N to F owner-
ship status. Slightly over 6,000 discharges were observed from thirty-
five hospitals after the ownership conversion occurred. The main F
sample consisted of 56,000 discharges from 165 hospitals. Among
these, thirty-two hospitals experienced a conversion from F to N or G
status during the observational period. Data were available fromHospital Ownership Conversions 143
Table 5.1
Samplesa
Sample screen Patients Hospitals
GN sample 418,831 1,215
GN to F subsample 16,354 49
GN to F after 6,050 35
F sample 56,231 165
F to GN sample 6,500 32
F to GN after 2,331 20
aDoes not include observations drawn for analysis of coding of stroke versus transient
ischemic attack (TIA).
twenty hospitals converting from F to N or G ownership for the period
after the conversion occurred.
I constructed a counterfactual sample. This sample of hospital dis-
charges was matched to the conversion sample with respect to base
ownership (GN or F). An artificial conversion year was randomly as-
signed to the admission. The frequency distribution of conversion
years in the counterfactual sample matched thefrequency distribution
of actual conversions.
Given the large number of hospital discharges, there were many sta-
tistically significant differences between hospitals that did not convert
and those that did convert, as well as for the pre versus postconversion
comparisons (table 5.2). The differences, however, were often small.
For the GN sample, these are the most noteworthy differences.
Hospitals converting from GN to F status experienced increases in
the proportion of nonwhites that they admitted. Admissions through
the emergency room fell, as did the receipt of patients from other hos-
pitals. For converting hospitals, the mean DRG weight fell after conver-
sion. A drop of 0.2 in the mean DRG weight for the five primary
diagnoses is substantial. By contrast, in the counterfactual comparison
group, the DRG weight rose in the after group in contrast tothe before
group. The mean DxCG score rose from 2.1 to 2.2before versus after
conversion to F status. For the comparison group, the mean score rose
from 2.0 to 2.2. Medicare payment is based on the DRG weight but not
the DxCG score. This comparison suggests something less than a mas-
sive change in upcoding for purposes of obtaining higher Medicare


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Hospital Ownership Conversions 147
In the counterfactual group, mean bed size remained about constant.
Among converting hospitals, however, mean bed size fell by more than
50 percent after conversion. The number of residents per bed rose
among converting hospitals, but this change was fullyattributable to
the reduction in beds. Operating margins in converting hospitals rose
dramatically. Before conversion, the mean margin per discharge in con-
verting hospitals was 0.015. After conversion, the mean was 0.085. By
contrast, in the counterfactual group, operating margins remained
about constant. The debt-to-assets ratio fell for both converting and
nonconverting hospitals, but much more for those hospitals that did
not convert. The mean occupancy rate fell from 57 to 52 percent for
converting hospitals, in spite of the substantial reduction in bed size.
For nonconverting hospitals, however, mean occupancy decreased
only from 67 to 65 percent. Clearly, low occupancy rates were far more
characteristic of hospitals converting from GN to F than among hospi-
tals that did not convert.
For converting hospitals, the Herfindahi index rose, suggesting a de-
cline in competition. By contrast, for hospitals that did not convert, the
Herfindahi index was unchanged. Personal per-capita income fell on
average in the zip code areas in which the convertinghospitals were lo-
cated. But there was no change in income among nonconverting
hospitals.
Many of the patterns were similar in the F sample. For example, the
mean DRG weight declined slightly after conversion to GN status. By
contrast, for hospitals in the counterfactual group, the mean DRG rose
after the conversion. The major difference was in the operating margin.
Margins increased much more among nonconverting than among con-
verting hospitals. As seen above, for GN hospitals, margins increased
appreciably for hospitals converting to F ownership.
The mean in-hospital mortality rate in the GN sample hospitalized in
nonconverting hospitals was 8.1 percent (table 5.3). For those hospital-
ized in converting hospitals, the mean mortality rate was 7.9 percent.
Even with this large sample, this difference was not statistically signi-
ficant at conventional levels. Although mortality fell from 8.2 percent
before to 7.6 percent after conversion in converting hospitals, this dif-
ference was not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.19).
In the counterfactual sample, the decline was apparently larger, from
8.7 percent in the counterfactual before group to 7.5 percent in the after
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tient mortality which apparently was not as favorable among hospitals
that changed from GN to F ownership status.
The rate of pneumonia complications rose in hospitals converting
from GN to F after conversion. The increase was from 3.8 to 5.0 percent
(p = 0.001). In the counterfactual sample, there was no change. Rates of
extended stays, as did mean length of stay, declined much more in hos-
pitals that were involved in ownership conversions than in those not
involved in a conversion, implying that hospitals converting from GN
to F made a substantial effort to reduce the very long lengths of stay.
Mean length of stay declined in both converting and nonconverting
hospitals, but more so in the former.
For the F sample, mortality rates declined by the same absolute
amount for those hospitals that converted versus the counterfactual
sample, but those that converted had a higher mortality rate in the be-
fore period. Pneumonia complication rates rose among those hospitals
that remained for-profit, but these rates did not rise among those that
converted from for-profit to either government or private nonprofit
status. The rate of extended stays rose dramatically among hospitals in
the converting group, but remained constant among those that did not
convert, a very different pattern from hospitals in the GN sample.
Thus, overall, judging on the basis of mean values alone, a couple
of negative features emerge in the GN-to-F case. The in-hospital mor-
tality experience was not as good among hospitals that converted from
GN to F status. Furthermore, pneumonia complication rates rose
among those hospitals that converted from GN to F and among those
for-profit hospitals that did not convert. Length of stay was related to
ownership, with for-profit hospitals achieving lower lengths of stay
overall.
Effects of Ownership Type Conversions on Inpatient Mortality,
Pneumonia Complications, and Extended Length of Stay
The multivariate analysis of ownership type conversion effects begins
with effects on inpatient mortality, and pneumonia complications dur-
ing the stay occurring to patients admitted for stroke, hip fracture, cor-
onary heart disease, and congestive heart failure (table 5.4). In the first
specification in the GN sample, inpatient mortality fell after conversion
to F ownership. The decline was 0.8 percent on average, or about 10
percent relative to mean mortality. (The numbers in the table in brack-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Hospital Ownership Conversions 153
change in binary or a unit change in explanatory variables for continu-
ous variables.9) In the remaining specifications, however, there was no
change in inpatient mortality after conversion to F ownership. The re-
sults for the conversion fixed effect in specifications 2 to 4 imply that
hospitals that converted from G or N to F ownership tended to have
lower mortality rates. That is, if anything, the new owners selected GN
hospitals with relatively good mortality records.
In the F sample, the first specification implies a mortality increase af-
ter conversion to G or N status with an associated marginal effect of
0.012 (p = 0.01). However, the after conversion parameter becomes sta-
tistically insignificant in the other, more complete specifications. In
general, the results on the key parameters of interestthe binary vari-
ables for after conversion and the conversion fixed effectare quite
sensitive to changes in equation specification. Thus, again, ownership
conversion had no effect on inpatient mortality
The proportion of patients with very long stays declined in the G and
N to F case and rose for conversions in the opposite direction, support-
ing the descriptive results presented above in table 5.3. Pneumonia
complications rose after conversion among patients admitted to hospi-
tals that converted to F ownership. The reverse occurred among pa-
tients admitted to hospitals that converted from F ownership. This
conclusion holds for the full sample of Medicare patients in the four
primary diagnosis categories (excluding those admitted with a pri-
mary diagnosis of pneumonia) and for a sample that excludes such pa-
tients who died during their stays.
To conserve space and permit focus on the key parameter estimates
and associated marginal effects, table 5.4 does not include most of the
parameter estimates in the model. Table 5.5 shows complete specifica-
tions from the GN sample for four dependent variables shown previ-
ously, but the table does not show area fixed effects. Almost all the pa-
rameter estimates on the patient variables are statistically significant at
conventional levels and have plausible signs.
Results for the hospital and market variables are somewhat more
mixed. The measures of financial distress show no consistent effects on
outcomes. For example, hospitals with an operating loss (no profit) ex-
perienced higher rates of pneumonia complications and a higher mean
length of stay, but there were no effects on either inpatient mortality or
the rate of extended stays. Death rates were higher in larger hospitals
but lower in major teaching hospitals. The result for hospital size plau-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tended stay is positive and statistically significant at conventional
levels.
Finally, to the extent that hospitals converting from GN to F status
achieved shorter lengths of stays after ownership conversion, was this
achieved by increased rates of transfers to nursing homes or to other
hospitals? To determine the answer to this question, multinomial logit
analysis of the place to which the person was discharged after leaving
the hospital was conducted (table 5.6). The four destinations were
home (reference group), death, nursing home, and other hospital. The
analysis controlled, among other factors, for source of admission (nurs-
ing home, other hospital, emergency room, home) because patients
were more likely to return to the place from which they came to the
hospital. But given the number of parameter estimates in a multi-
nomial format, area fixed effects were not included. As in all of the
other analyses, year binary variables were included. Results shown in
the table 5.6 are based on specification 3.
In the GN sample, 8.1 percent of persons died in the hospital, 15.3
percent were transferred to a nursing home, 10.1 percent were trans-
ferred to another hospital, and the remaining two-thirds (65.5 percent)
returned home. The pattern of discharge destinations was similar for
the F sample, with a slightly lower percentage of patients returning
home and a somewhat higher percentage being transferred to other
hospitalspossibly reflecting their smaller bed size.
Holding other factors constant, the rate of discharges to other hospi-
tals increased after conversion for GN to F hospitals (relative to dis-
charge to home). The associated marginal effect of 0.039 is substantial
relative to the sample mean transfer rate (about 40 percent of the sam-
ple mean). In view of the dramatic drop in bed size among GN-to-F
converting hospitals noted earlier, an increase in the transfer rate to
other hospitals is not surprising. In the F sample, discharges to nursing
home increased after conversion, but the associated marginal effects
were very small.
Upcoding of Diagnoses
For the measures studied, there is no evidence that ownership conver-
sion from GN to F ownership status increased the rate of upcoding
(table 5.7). In the analysis of mean DRG weight of the five primary di-
agnoses included in the Medicare analysis, the DRG weight fell after




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































istics, including bed size, were held constant. Thus, the results for own-
ership conversion do not reflect just downsizing and loss of some
sophisticated product lines. Of course, a decrease in the mean DRG
may have reflected subtle changes in case mix. To the extent that this
occurred, it more than obscures any change in upcoding for the five
primary diagnoses included in this analysis that may have occurred.
For coding of transient ischemic attack (TIA) versus stroke, there was
an increase in the proportion of TIAs (significant at the 10 percent level)
following conversion from GN to F status. By contrast, hospitals that
converted from F to GN did have higher DRG weights after conversion.
Similarly, the proportion of cases coded as stroke rather than TIA rose.
V. Results: Patients Under Age 65
Payer Mix after Ownership Conversion
As discussed in the previous section, there is widespread concern that
ownership conversions work to the disadvantage of underserved pop-
ulations. However, empirical evidence on actual effects has been
mixed. Table 5.8 presents key results of a multinomial analysis of antic-
ipated source of payment. Since the payment categories are confined to
the primary source of payment, they are mutually exclusive. For pa-
tients who were between the ages of 1 and 64 at the admission date and
were admitted to a facility in the GN sample, the probability of having
Medicare, other government insurance, or Medicaid, or being classified
as a self-pay/no charge patient increased after conversion to F status. G
or N hospitals acquired by F owners tended to be those that had rela-
tively low proportions of Medicaid and self-pay/no charge patients, or
Medicare (disabled, end stage kidney disease) patients. However, the
tendency to eschew the poor and the disabled was not sustained after
conversion.
Results for hospitals converting from F to GN ownership are mixed.
The proportion of self-pay/no charge patients fell after conversion to
GN status. For the sample of births, holding other factors constant, hos-
pitals converting from GN to F were more, not less, likely to admit
nonprivately insured patients after the conversion occurred (table 5.9).
This finding is very sensitive to changes in equation specification. The
conversion fixed effect is negative and the associated marginal effect is
substantial. The implication is that for-profit organizations were more



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Logit analysis of probability of payment other than private insurance for labor delivery,
less than two-day stay, and vaginal birtha
a Based on specification 3. Standarderrors corrected for heteroscedasticity. Standard
errors in parentheses and marginal effects in brackets.
b Significantat 1% level (two-tail test).
Significant at 5% level (two-tail test).
d Significant at 10% level (two-tailtest).
sured patients, but after conversion, there was a major increase in
nonprivately insured patients. The marginal effect is 0.224. Since time
fixed effects were included, the marginal effect for the after-conversion
dummy does not reflect a secular growth in persons not covered by pri-
vate insurance. Patterns for conversions from F to GN status were quite
similar to those from GN to F.
Changes in Length of Stays: Birth Sample
There is widespread concern that the length of hospital stays for labor
and delivery have declined to unsafe levels. Such reductions are said to
be motivated mostly by a desire to increase profit. Some states have im-
plemented laws to restrict the ability of health care providers to limit
stays for labor and delivery to less than two days. Table 5.9 shows that
the probability of a less-than-two-day stay declined after ownership
conversion, both for hospitals that converted from GN to F status and
those that converted in the opposite direction.
GN sample F sample
Probability of payment other than private insurance
After conversion 0.916(0.046)[0224]b 0.884(0.107)[0.218]"
Conversion fixed effect 0.417(0.026)[0098]b0.187(0.083)[_0.044]c
Number of observations 558,268 32,527
Pseudo R2
0.188 0.213
Probability of less than two-day stay
After conversion 0.391(0.056)[0025]"0.206(0.117)[0017]d
Conversion fixed effect0.347(0.028)[-0.023]"0.085(0.092)[-0.007]
Number of observations566,927 32,635
Pseudo R2
0.015 0.024
Probability of vaginal birth
After conversion 0.340(0.049)[0.025]" 0.123(0.103) [0.0241
Conversion fixed effect 0.252(0.024) [0025]b 0.299(0.075)[0061]b
Number of observations 567,605 32,635
Pseudo R2 0.293 0.315Hospital Ownership Conversions 163
Changes in the Probability of Vaginal Births
The proportion of vaginal births declined after hospitals converted
from government or not-for-profit to for-profit status (table 5.9). For
hospitals that converted from F to GN status, there was an increase in
the probability of vaginal births, but this increase was notstatistically
significant at conventional levels.
VI. Discussion, Conclusions, and Implications
The main question addressed by this paper is whether or not the mar-
ket for hospitals is fundamentally broke. In my review of the literature
of cross-sectional evidence on differences in hospital behavior by own-
ership type, I conclude that hospitals with various types ofownership
were more alike than different (Sloan 2000).With longitudinal data on
the same set of hospitals (panel data), the research focus has been on
changes in behavior for the same hospital following a change in owner-
ship. With a panel, isolating the effect of the change in ownership can
be done more precisely.
In many respects, the empirical evidence from hospital conversions
is reassuring. In particular, in this study, I did not find thatin-hospital
mortality changed as a result of changes in ownership type. Payer mix,
including the proportion of persons admitted without health insur-
ance, was not affected. On the whole,hospitals' missions appear to be
preserved postconversion. In large part, constancy of mission has been
safeguarded by contract provisions that are made part of the agree-
ment between the buying and selling hospitals at the timeof the trans-
action. The analysis presented in the previous section did notreveal
systematic upcoding by hospitals that converted to for-profit owner-
ship status. Thus, the upcoding for pneumonia and respiratory infec-
tions reported in an earlier study does not appear to generalize to other
diagnoses.
However, rates of pneumonia complications rose following conver-
sions from government or private nonprofit to for-profitownership. In
another recent study cited in this paper, mortality rates following dis-
charge rose appreciably following conversion at hospitals that con-
verted from government or private nonprofit to for-profit ownership,
especially during the first two years after the conversion occurred. One
reason that there would be no change inin-hospital mortality, but
an increase in mortality observed atthirty days, six months, and
one year following admission tothe hospital, may be that hospitals164 Sloan
converting to for-profit ownership reduced lengths of hospital stay
disproportionately.
The evidence pointing to some adverse effects of conversions isa
reason for concern and should affect public policy regarding hospital
ownership conversions. There is a clear role for public oversight. Suc-
cess is not guaranteedthe "Allegany system debacle," where effec-
tive public oversight was lacking, is a case in point. Communities that
place their hospital assets for sale would do well to exercise due dili-
gence. This may take the form of oversight by the state attorney general
or the state certificate of need agency as well as local elected officials
Practices such as upcoding should be monitored by hospital compli-
ance programs. Some public oversight of hospital staffing during the
years immediately following conversion seems warranted based on the
empirical evidence.
Is there a chance that this study has failed to document important
changes in quality of care and/or public goods provision associated
with changes in hospital ownership status? Almost certainlyyes. The
issues involved are complex, and there are so many kinds of outcomes.
This consideration adds further force to the conclusion that scrutiny
should be case-specific. Rather than conclude that all conversions ofa
given type are "bad" or "good," public policy should recognize the het-
erogeneity and multiplicity of outcomes.
Notes
I acknowledge the capable research assistance of Jingshu Wang, Department of Econom-
ics and Center for Health Policy, Law, and Management, Duke University, and the grant,
Hospital Ozvnership Conversions, from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and adininis-
tered by the Academy for Health Services Research and Health Policy
Of course, the two aspects are related, If there are many concessionson nonprice di-
mensions of the transaction, the price should reflect this.
This result is consistent with the finding by Thorpe et al. (2000) that margins increased
after conversion to for-profit status, mainly because of expense reductions.
In some unpublished work, colleagues and I followed the suggestion to includea bi-
nary for trauma center in analysis of survival following inpatient stays. The variable typ-
ically did not affect outcomes. One might argue that a trauma center is endogenousto
ownership.
Their technique includes the equivalent of hospital fixed effects.
A more complete discussion of the effects of hospital competition on quality ofcare is
beyond the scope of this paper. On this subject, see, for example, Kessler and McClellan
(2000).Hospital Ownership Conversions 165
This has been documented by others as well. See, for example, Eldenburg et al. (2001).
This result is consistent with a view advanced by Lakdawalla and Philipson (1999).
They argued that nonprofit behavior should not affect for-profit behavior because the lat-
ter, by virtue of the lack of tax advantages and charitable endowments, are the marginal
firms and hence influence market outcomes (price, quality, etc.).
Medicare compliance, coding, self-referral, and joint ventures have become major is-
sues to hospitals. See, for example, a newsletter for hospital administrators explicitly de-
voted to these issues: Eli Research, "Hospital Compliance Alert."
In table 5.4, all explanatory variables shown are binaries.
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